Introduction
In 1945 it was obvious to virtually everyone in the San Francisco Bay Area that the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge would soon be hopelessly congested. Opened to motor vehicle traffic in 1936, the bridge was a huge tratic and financial success. Financing for this monumental public work was provided by Herbert Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which bought the first $62 million of toll-secured revenue bonds in late 1932. The project was one of Hoover's personal favorites. The Great Engineer had been associated with the location studies done for the bridge in the late 1920s. Because it was one of RFC's earliest and largest efforts to create employment during the darkest depression days, the president hoped it would prove a political as well as an engineering triumph. 1 The history of efforts to deal with the Bay Bridge problem provides case material for developing a theory of the politics of transport infrastructure projects. There are two primary analytical dimensions. One is the influence of urban rivalry on all aspects of infrastructure planning and implementation. The second concerns the circumstances that permit rivalryinduced political stalemates to be broken.
Urban Rivalry and Infrastructure Politics
As Christine Rosen notes in a study of nineteenth-century urban public works, "infrastructural development, by its very nature, usually benefited some people more than others or benefited some people while hurting others."2 The inherently uneven distribution of project benefits, particularly those of transport projects, across space and over time creates location advantages for some places and disadvantages others. Since capital in the United States is mobile, places are continuously competing with one another to maintain and attract capital investment. This basic feature of the U. S. urban development process ofien gives rise, therefore, to coalitions of place-rooted investors, which form to defend and advance local interests. Infrastructure projects are inevitably strategic weapons in the hands of these coalitions, which seek to deploy them in order to gain location advantages. Competing coalitions try to use infrastructure projects to shape development, rather than simply to respond to existing demand forces. 3 Urban rivalry, then, produces controversy regarding all aspects of project planning and implementation. The most coIltroversial projects are metropolitan-scale facilities that will concentrate benefits in one place or in a small number of places that are jointly pursuing location advantage. Given the relative responsiveness of political structures at all United States government levels to local concerns, controversy may produce stalemate, as local coalitions within the same metropolitan region collide in their efforts to defend and advance their interests.
Transcending Stalemate
This study analyzes the possibilities and limits of three ways around stalemate. One is through consensus-building. Consensus is achievable if individual projects can be designed and financed in a disaggregated way, both spatially and temporally, so that the development aspirations of many competing places can be served. The contents of the package reflect the relative political strengths of the participants in the process. Classical pork barrel politics are a species of consensus-building.
The second way around stalemate is through a claim of political and military priority public interest which can be used either to support a project or to oppose one advanced by a competitor. Such a claim aims at silencing opposition, thereby protecting projects from challenge by disadvantaged coalitions. The argument is straightforward: projects that will contribute substantially to political and economic stability or military preparedness must override narrow self-interested concerns of individual localities. In the public works field) political and military claims have historically been crucial in legitimating government action. The French national government saw fit to subsidize Haussmann's reconstruction of central Paris primarily because of such considerations, and public works spending has since been linked with governmental concern over unemployment-caused political instability.4 Ironically, project sponsors have often been constrained as a result of this linkage, coming into conflict with government officials seeking to regulate public works spending solely in relation to stabilization concerns.
The third way around stalemate is through access to financial capital. Haussmann, once again, worked closely with Parisian financiers, and Robert Moses forged long-lasting alliances with New York bond market participants.5 Like a claim of political or military priority, an access claim serves to protect particular projects from challenges brought by competitors. The relatively autonomous governmental agencies often created to finance and build irlfrastructure utilized by Moses and others to great advantage, further reinforce the protection enjoyed by favored projects.
All three of these ways around stalemate were tried during the thirteenyear-long effort to deal with Bay Bridge congestion. Consensus-buildirlg was the objective of the Bay Area Council (BAC), the regional corporateelite policy planning group. BAC was formed in an effort to get the region7s big business leadership to organize itself for the competitive struggle ahead. As Francis V. Keesling, chairman of BAC's executive committee told a conference discussing peacetime reconversion issues, "What we are trying to do is to solidify the Bay Area against the inroads which Los Angeles might make. We want to protect ourselves against the activities of the South, and I take my hat oW to them for they are certaiIlly doing a job." BAC was the only functioning regional organization in the Bay Area, with committees operating in each of the nine counties comprising the region.6
Traffic and transportation issues were crucial for the council. It saw a need for huge amounts of transportation infrastructure to accomodate Bay Area population and economic growth. The concern was that insufficient transport capacity would "strangle" the region, "choking off' potential growth, driving business elsewhere, and causing the regional economy to "stagnate" and then decline. BAC developed numerous plans and proposals intended to generate consensus regarding united region-wide action.
During the cold war 1940s and 1950s rival places filled the air with political and military priority claims, continuing a strategy that Bay Area place-coalitions had developed following World War I. Roger Lotchin notes that the Bay Area emerged as a metropolitan-military complex in the 1920s, as the region sought military resources in order to stimulate regional economic growth. Lotchin emphasizes rivalry between San Francisco and Los Angeles as the spur to Bay Area militarization, a strategy that virtually all organized groups in San Francisco supported. At the same time, the navy was suffering in inter-service rivalries, and was seeking civilian friends. During this period the Bay Area learned to trumpet the defense rationale in order to unify the region and to generate support for increased military spending. 7 The downtown San Francisco financial community played a central role in the infrastructure planning process. Annmarie Walsh notes that "the principles of the bond market insist that financial considerations should determine policy." An important consequence of this central role played by private financial capital, Walsh argues, is that highway projects are favored over commuter rail transportation, because of the profitability of the former and the fiscal incapacity of the latter.8 Finance capital institutions, however, have both a general interest in underwriting infrastructure projects, as well as investments rooted in particular places. Walsh doesn't attribute spatial concerns to bond market participants that might be reflected in support for rail rapid transit. In the Bay Area, downtown San Francisco financiers chose to grant access to a metropolitan-scale commuter rail project Bay Area Rapid Transit (BARTArather than to a bridge/highway facility in order to deal with Bay Bridge congestion. While this particular way around stalemate was eventually the one charted, it was as controversial as the others. A unified regional program for the Bay Area remained highly problematic.
Bay Area Rivalrzes and San Francisco Bay Crossings
The original Bay Bridge project was handled by RFC's Self-Liquidating Division. RFC was interested in financing only those projects which were certain not to default on their interest and principal payments. Insistence on financial soundness flowed directly from RFC's orientation as primarily a banker's organization. minimize and protect the federal government's financial commitment. Among these were requirements that the California legislature vote the funds for building the approaches to the bridge and also approve paying the operating, maintenance, and insurance costs for the structure out of state highway funds rather than from tolls. 10 The state legislature reluctantly agreed to these terms, but the resulting combination of state and federal fiscal conservatism caused the construction of a more cramped Bay Bridge than a less cautious financial arrangement might have allowed. Approaches to the structure were very limited on both the San Francisco and East Bay sides, and the traffic lanes on the bridge were narrow. The double-decked span carried automobile traffic on the upper level. The lower deck carried commercial vehicles and the Bridge Railway, which consisted of two sets of tracks running directly into a Transbay Transit Terminal located on the fringe of the San Francisco central business district. 11
Bridge rail patronage was, however, very disappointing, falling well below expectations. Designed to carry fifty million people per year, and seventeen thousand during the peak twenty-minute period, in 1941 the rails handled just fourteen million. Even during the war, when automobile traffic was constrained, twenty-seven million were transported during the peak year of 1945, just fifty-four percent of capacity. In only one year, 1945, were Bridge Railway toll revenues sufficient to meet even the interest costs on the rail portion of the bridge, necessitating a subsidy from auto users. 12 In October 1945, the California Toll Bridge Authority (CTBA), the state-created agency that built and managed the structure, approved a study to be made by the Department of Public Works (DPW) of an additional crossing of San Francisco Bay. The CTBA action was supported and encouraged by numerous business, labor, and civic groups, led by the recently created Bay Area Council. 13 The main protagonists on the bay crossing issue were the cities of San Francisco and Oakland, although the rest of the region would become involved in the conflict. There were two major points of contention. The San Francisco Labor Council consistently supported a southern crossing, reflecting a concern with the future of industrial production within the city. Manufacturing firms were concentrated along the city's bayshore in the vicinity of a southern crossing. A southern crossing would facilitate freight transport between San Francisco's manufacturing district and related firms in the East Bay, as well as improve travel conditions between working-class residential areas in the southeastern sector of the city and industrial production zones in southern Alameda County.
San Francisco officials were also deeply concerned with the possible negative impacts of a parallel bridge on downtown traffic problems. The two bridges would channel an increasing volume of traffic through the city's central core. Technical and political leaders argued that an elaborate and extremely expensive network of approach and downtown freeway distribution structures would be required to protect downtown streets from paralyzing congestion. The city leadership was distressed at the prospect of locally financing these expensive structures. The East Bay would not likely favor including these costly structures as part of the bridge project. DPW would also likely be concerned with the effect of including the structures on the project's financial feasibility. 14 Oakland sought to protect its competitive position as a regional center 16 In April the full House approved a resolution creating a Joint Army-Navy Investigative Board (JANB). The navy was cool to the subject. The military had studied the question of additional crossings in 1941 and concluded that increased capacity was not necessary for defense purposes. President Truman, however, was said to be favorably disposed to the study. Congressman Welch told an appreciative San Francisco Board of Supervisors that any plan for a second crossing should include railroad tracks. Oakland Mayor Herbert Beach condemned Welch, saying he would oppose any low-level structure that would blockade the Oakland Port. The Oakland Chamber of Commerce stood behirld their mayor, attacking this blatant move to steer traffic into San Francisco. 17 The Joint Army-Navy Board came to the Bay Area to conduct public hearings during the summer of 1946. The San Francisco delegation to the board was led by Supervisor Marvin Lewis, who had staked out the transportation area as one of his main governmental concerns. The San Frarlcisco supervisors sent Lewis to the board hearings armed with a unanimously adopted Lewis-sponsored resolution stating that the best interests of San Francisco called for a mainline railroad connection to a Union Depot over any second bay crossing. Lewis reported back how proud he was that San Francisco had been able to present a united front on the need for trains; downtown interests, labor groups, and improvement clubs all supported the position. Lewis also noted Oaklandys expressec . opposition. Alliance possibilities were emerging on the issue, however. Cities in southern Alameda County were breaking with Oakland on the bridge location question, and agreeing with San Francisco on the advantages of a southern crossing. Moreover, San Mateo County was likewise interested in additional transport capacity closer to San Mateo. The Oakland-supported crossing would be less desirable for peninsula cities so they were lining up with San Francisco as well. 18 On January 25, 1947, JANB reported its findings. The board proposed the immediate construction of a southern crossing of San Francisco Bay, but found there wasn't any need for railroad tracks on the structure. The board had directly questioned the major rail carriers on this question. They had all unequivocally denied any interest in extending their passenger facilities in the Bay Area. The board agreed that a southern location would best facilitate future regional growth. They also noted that while there wasn't any need for an additional crossing from a national defense standpoint, security precautions dictated that bridge structures be dispersed to decrease their vulnerability to enemy attack. The military engineers also pointed out that a parallel crossing close to the existing one would have a harmful effect on downtown San Francisco, worsening traffic congestion there. This was crucial because the relative ability of crossings to enable peak hour commuters to get into and out of the San Francisco central business district was a major location criterion.
1S. San Francisco
The Army-Navy Board surprised everyone with a companion recommendation to its call for a southern crossing. They broadened their field of vision to consider transit issues in relation to motor vehicle traffic and told the Bay Area that it would be impossible continually to construct highway crossings and related parking facilities. At some point automotive congestion would become so severe that the area would be forced to increase its use of transit. The board proposed that the Bay Area begin to plan now for this eventuality. They noted that extensive rail capacity was already available, but was seriously underutilized. This, the board argued, was because the existing service, supplied by the privately-owned Key System, was very poor. The solution was a fially integrated rail rapid transit service using grade-separated exclusive rights-of-way in San Francisco and the East Bay, and an underwater tube to make the connection. The board even went so far as to consult with various tunnel and other transit engineering experts on a tentative plan of routes and estimated costs for such a rail system. The total cost came in at $208 million, with the centerpiece tube costing $74 million. Constructing a tube had an additional benefit: 21 In late August 1947, the secretaries of the army and navy released their final report. They agreed with JANB in all particulars, including the transcontinental railroad question; no train tracks were warranted on a southern crossing.22 BAC's Traffic and Transportation Committee dissented, voting 18-6 in favor of a parallel bridge. The majority argued that relief of congestion on the existing bridge was the chief priority, and a parallel bridge would accomplish this more cheaply and effectively than a southern crossing. Regarding the transit proposal, the committee majority pointed out that the cost of the tube alone was estimated at $74 million and the total project at $208 million. The committee "believed that the difficulties of organizing and firlancing such a system within the near future would be insurmountable, and in view of the other great needs of the communities 19 In November CTBA declared that its policy would be to blaild both bridges. DPW was to proceed with plans and right-of-way acquisition for both structures. DPW Director Charles Purcell, chief engineer on the original Bay Bridge project, announced he would appoint a special Bay Toll Crossings Division to recommend which bridge ought to be built first. 26 In November 1948, Ralph Tudor, chief engineer for the Bay Toll Crossings Division, recommended building the parallel bridge first. He pointed out that traffic and revenue studies done by Coverdale and Colpitts said that the parallel bridge should have priority because more than eighty percent of the vehicles crossing the existing bridge would be served by it, while only twenty percent would be attracted to a southern crossing.27
The united front in San Francisco in support of a southern crossing now began to crumble, as the downtown business community switched its allegiance to the parallel bridge. In friends were divided, though. They favored a southern location but differed as to exactly where the bridge termini should be. 28 There seem to be two reasons why the major business organizations changed their minds on the bridge location issue. The more important was that they were never really committed to a southern location. The crucial aspects were the transcontinental trains and a downtown passenger terminal. Only a southern crossing could accommodate trains, so the business community supported a southern crossing. When it became clear there weren't going to be any railroad passengers coming directly downtown, the business groups looked to other short-range alternatives that would increase downtown reception capacity. A parallel bridge appeared more appropriate for this. The other reason was that it looked as if a parallel bridge was going to be built anyway. This was what the state wanted to do; the bridge was a local matter. The military engineers had already said there wasn't a need for another bridge from a national defense standpoint. Moreover, downtown groups and the BAC Committee believed that construction of an underwater transit tube was a very longterm, uncertain prospect, given the cost and current transit dynamics. If additional freeways were necessary to avoid congestion caused by the increased number of motor vehicles in central San Francisco, then, the business groups thought, these ought to be built. The Breed bill authorized CTBA to continue to collect tolls to finance construction of additional approaches and improvements to the Bay Bridge. The amount of money spent on the additions was to be the same on both sides of the bay. In addition, the bill authorized studies to bring plans for the southern crossing up to par with the work already done by DPW on the parallel bridge.36 However, as the Breed bill wound its way through the Senate, a new element was interjected into the Bay Area bridge question. The field of competition broadened as senators from the other northern California counties, concerned about the relation of bridge project financing to the state highway fund, decided it was time the Bay Area settled an old debt. ready determined that both additional crossings were necessary. He stated that he was satisfied there wouldn't be any problem in financing construction of both projects simultaneously. 39 The instructed to take all necessary steps including securing necessary federal legislation and permits to build the southern crossing. Dolwig was sure to include the conditions requested by Senator Hatfield and his associates: the state highway fund would be repaid for historic Bay Bridge expenses, including maintenance, insurance, and operating costs; and all such fiature costs would be paid from tolls.43
The state legislature had finally resolved the controversy, in a manner that reflected the strength of the alliance Dolwig had been able to construct. However, as in 1949, a battle had been won, but the war was not yet over. Oakland leaders felt betrayed by their San Francisco counterparts because the San Francisco leadership had abandoned the idea of simultaneous construction. Moreover, Oakland still had a few Washington, D.C. options available. The national government had to give its permission to continue toll collection on the Bay Bridge to help finance additional construction. Senator William Knowland was said to be seeking an amendment to the necessary federal legislation that would would guarantee building a parallel bridge after the southern crossing was finished.
In 1949, when CTBA wanted to build a parallel bridge, Oakland leaders told the Congress this was a purely local matter. San Francisco leaders now said the same thing. The conflict between the cities, however, was as obvious in 1953 as it had been in 1949. The House Public Works Committee chairman noted the bitterness; he offered the Bay Area leaders the use of his conference room to achieve consensus rather than come before the Congress disunited. The chairman pointed out one of the well-known rules of legislative procedure: a higher level of government was loathe to enter into conflicts at a lower level. It was far preferable that local people work out their differences without outside intervention.
Oakland Mayor Rishell angrily told the House Committee that there had already been two agreements with San Francisco, but San Francisco had run out on them. Oakland was now supporting an amendment offiered by an Alameda County representative that would specify in the federal legislation that a parallel bridge be built following the southern crossing. The House, however, was obviously reluctant to write something so specific when the state legislature had declined to do so.44 Congress passed legislation authorizing continued toll collection but refused to include a provision mandating parallel bridge construction.45 The next step was a permit from the army to cross navigable waters. nents by opposing DPW's request to the army for a permit. The navy gave a flat "No' to the West Bay location specified in the Dolwig Act because the navy had plans for possible seaplane development in the area. These plans were so new and so secret that the Bay Area navy official who made public the opposition did not know any of the details. This was a decision taken at the top level of the navy command in Washington; the local navy people were as surprised as everyone else. The San Francisco Examiner editorially charged that "political" considerations motivated the navy action. Moreover, just as the Tribune had argued that military concerns were inappropriately being put forward in 1949, the Examiner now felt the navy had gotten out of line:46
[When] the Navy attempts to grab offa vast expanse of the Bay waters for some possible future need, when the Navy springs its demands as a complete and patently intentional surprise that prevents city offlcials from cross-examining to develop the facts, when the Navy would so casually kill a multimillion dollar civilian bridge project, we say the Navy has overreached itself.
San Francisco mobilized to wring concessions for the navy. Under intense pressure the navy bent sufficiently to allow a modified southern crossing project. The bends, however, increased construction costs and presented significant engineering difficulties. During 1954, though, DPW was able to secure the necessary army permits; the state engineers then settled into the detailed design work necessary to develop a financing and construction program.47
Seven years after the Joint Army-Navy Board had proposed it, a southern crossing was finally at the top of the Bay Area transportation agenda. The 1953 Dolwig Act declared the southern crossing to be the next transbay transport facility. The crossing was granted exclusive access to surplus Bay Bridge revenues, thereby assuring a source of income for the project.
The success of the southern crossing proponents would be extremely consequential for the future history of the regional rail rapid transit movement. In the Joint Army-Navy Board plan the crossing and regional rapid transit were complementary elements in a comprehensive solution to Bay Area transportation needs. These elements would, however, increasingly come into conflict with each other. In addition, the final defeat of the parallel bridge changed the character of the Oakland leadership's participation in the regional rapid transit movement. Oakland had successfully parried San Francisco's thrusts toward regional rapid transit since Marvin Lewis seized the initiative in 1948. Such a system appeared to Oakland as an obvious effiort to penetrate rapidly growing peripheral areas in the East Bay, thereby consolidating downtown San Francisco's leading position Regardless of what he meant by "pure democracy '2 Moley is clearly wrong regarding its incapacities. Imagination, energy, and a disciplined mentality have never been lacking. Rather, the abundance of these factors, generated by the structural fact of spatial competition and sustained by the responsiveness of legislative bodies to local investor coalitions, produces a strong tendency to stalemate the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects. The Bay Area case illuminates ways in which stalemate may at least partially be transcended.
The Bay Area Council labored mightily to build consensus regarding transport investment in the region. BAC claimed to articulate the interests of the region as a whole regarding infrastructure concerns. Yet competitive localities repeatedly undermined BAC efforts to unite the region behind an investment program. When BAC sought to assemble a package of projects designed to appeal to numerous competitors, the perception that the package included elements that would concentrate benefits disrupted consensus. Local coalitions continuously pursued governmental opportunities that would defend and advance their individual interests outside the BAC-organized consensus-building process.
However, while BAC failed to build consensus disaggregation was an essential aspect of overcoming the stalemate. The state legislature always respectful of local autonomy, permitted the peninsula counties to withdraw from the regional rapid transit project and supported their quest for locally oriented transport facilities. As a result, a variety of smaller-scale projects serving several subregional alliances became feasible.
At controversy coincided with the most intense period of cold war hostility as well as the Korean War, though, political and military considerations carried weight. San Francisco and Oakland both asserted such claims to defend against each other's initiatives. However, since large-scale unemployment was not an issue, nor was the country immediately subject to threat from without, political and military priority claims could not themselves provide a way of overcoming stalemate.
Access to project finance was decisive. However, even the financial gatekeepers were constrained by competing local coalitions. The California Toll Bridge Authority sought to build only those motor vehicle facilities they believed would be profitable, and to eschew investment in transit. The financiers leading the regional rapid transit movement were, however, able to steer the CTBA in the direction the transit activists wished to go. The financial disabilities of transit did force the movement to seek governmental subsidy, thereby opening up the project decision process to opponents and to popular electoral participation. This resulted in a much scaled-down project and relatively favorable terms for organized transit labor during the transition from a private to a governmental industry.
